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The Nebraska version of the Uniform Probate Code gives the
surviving spouse a right of election to one-third of the augmented
estate.' The augmented estate concept is a new addition to the laws
of succession in Nebraska. At common law, the widow was entitled
to her dower estate to the use for life of one-third of the lands and
tenements of which her husband was seised at any time during cov-
erture in fee simple or in fee tail. The purpose of dower was to
provide for the widow's support after her husband's death.2 The
prior statutes of Nebraska provided dower rights similar to those
of the common law.3 At common law, following the birth of issue,
the husband had a right as tenant by the curtesy in all the lands
and tenements of which the wife was seised at any time during cov-
erture.4 Here again, Nebraska provided similar statutory rights.5
Dower and curtesy were abolished long ago in Nebraska.
6 Stat-
utory dower and curtesy were thought to not be adequate because:
(1) they impeded the transferability of real property, (2) an urban
society is based more upon a residence and personalty than upon
real estate, and (3) protection against the deceased's creditors might
be unfair.7 In its place, the surviving husband or wife could elect
to take a share of the estate as determined under the intestacy stat-
utes." This applied to real estate9 and personal property.' At
common law there was no problem with the wife's personalty, since
it became the husband's upon marriage, and the wife had nothing
to dispose of either inter vivos or by will. After the Married
1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2313 (Reissue 1975).
2. 3 C. VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 188 (1935).
3. See, e.g., NEB. COMP. STAT. § 2824 (1905) (repealed 1907).
4. 3 C. VERNIER, supra note 2, § 215.
5. NEB. COMP. STAT. § 2852 (1905) (repealed 1907).
6. 1907 Neb. Laws c. 49, § 4.
7. T. ATKINSON,LAw OF WILLs § 30 (2d ed. 1953).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-107 (1943) (repealed 1974).
9. Id. § 30-101 (1943) (repealed 1974).
10. Id. § 30-103(b) (1943) (repealed 1974).
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Women's Act,1 1 the same result applied to the husband's person-
alty.
12
The statutory forced share determined under the intestacy stat-
utes proved to be vulnerable to inter vivos depletion of the dece-
dent's estate. 13 Devices were available whereby a husband could
disinherit his wife without pauperizing himself by the use of vari-
ous will substitutes. Once it has been decided that as a matter of
public policy' 4 a surviving spouse needs protection from the caprice
or waywardness of a pre-deceasing spouse, by the right to a mini-
mum share of the decedent's estate, the question then arises wheth-
er there is any limitation upon the freedom to substantially reduce
the size of the estate at death.15
The purpose of the augmented estate concept is premised upon
two policy considerations. First, the forced share is ineffective.
Under the forced share a wealthy spouse, by making various ar-
rangements during his lifetime, could deliberately defeat the right
of the surviving spouse to a reasonable share of the estate. Second,
it is unfair to allow a surviving spouse to disturb the decedent's es-
tate plan when the surviving spouse has already received more than
the statutory share through non-probate arrangements. 6 It should
be noted that the elective share of the augmented estate is not the
same as the intestate share of the surviving spouse.17
II. THE AUGMENTED ESTATE MECHANICS
It is first necessary to understand the mechanics of the aug-
mented estate concept. The computation of the augmented estate
is the sum of three distinct elements. The first element is the pro-
bate estate reduced by funeral and administrative expenses, home-
stead allowance,' 8 family allowances,' 9 exemptions, 20 and enforce-
11. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-201 to 207 (Reissue 1974).
12. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 29.
13. See W. MACDONALD, FRAuD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960).
14. Policy considerations surrounding the protection of the family unit in-
clude: (1) the obligation of support, (2) the presumed contribution of
the survivor's family, (3) the state's interest in protection from the
burdens of indigents, (4) equality of the sexes, and (5) fairness among
beneficiaries. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution
in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966).
15. Polster, The Use of Will Substitutes to Disinherit the Surviving
Spouse, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1962).
16. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 comment (Reissue 1975); Comment, Surviv-
ing Spouses-Uniform Probate Code Versus Pennsylvania's Probate, Es-
tates and Fiduciaries Code, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 576 (1973).
17. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302 (Reissue 1975) for the spouse's intestate
share.
18. Id. § 30-2322.
19. Id. § 30-2324.
20. Id. § 30-2323.
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able claims.21 The second element is the value of all property
transferred by the decedent to others during the marriage to the
extent adequate and full consideration was not received if: (1) the
decedent retained at the time of his death the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or right to income from, property,22 (2) the decedent re-
tained at the time of his death a power to revoke, consume or dis-
pose of the principal for his own benefit,23 (3) the transfer created
an interest involving the right of survivorship,24 or (4) the transfer
was made within two years of death, excepting gifts of three thou-
sand dollars or less to any one donee in either year.25 The third
element consists of the property owned by the surviving spouse at
the decedent's death plus property transferred by the surviving
spouse, to the extent the owned or transferred property was derived
from the decedent without full and adequate consideration. 26 Only
property derived from the decedent is included. It is presumed in
the Nebraska Probate Code that property owned or transferred by
the surviving spouse was derived from the decedent, except to the
extent that the surviving spouse can establish that it was derived
from another source.2 7 Transfers to the surviving spouse included
in the augmented estate are not limited to transfers taking place
during the marriage. 28 This presents complex tracing problems and
the burden is put on the surviving spouse to show that the property
is derived from a source other than the decedent.29 Excluded from
the augmented estate are transfers by the decedent prior to the
marriage and transfers consented to by the surviving spouse. Life
insurance, accident insurance, joint annuities, and pensions not pay-
able to the surviving spouse are also excluded.
3 0
The owned or transferred property which the surviving spouse
must account for in determining the size of the augmented estate
is applied as a set-off to the elective share to satisfy it.31 This set-
off can reduce or completely abolish the elective share.
Primarily because a clever estate planner could defeat the right
21. Id. § 30-2314(1).
22. Id. § 30-2314(1) (i).
23. Id. § 30-2314(1) (ii).
24. Id. § 30-2314(1) (iii).
25. Id. § 30-2314(1) (iv).
26. Id. § 30-2314(2).
27. Id. § 30-2314(2) (iii).
'28. Davies & Olson, Interspousal Transfers and Augmented Estate, 9
CREIGHTON L. REv. 481, 486 (1976).
29. ASsOcIATIoN OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. ADIINIsTRATORs, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.4 (1972).
30. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (Reissue 1975).
31. Id. § 30-2319(1).
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of the forced share32 by resort to various non-probate ownership ar-
rangements and also because the elective share was well established
with a deterrent effect upon those who might otherwise disinherit,
the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code adopted the policy deci-
sion of retaining the familiar elective share, but applying it through
the concept of the augmented estate.3 3 The purpose of this com-
ment is to examine whether the various methods used to defeat the
elective share are substantially reduced 34 and what methods still re-
tain a potential for disinheriting the surviving spouse.
III. EXISTING WILL SUBSTITUTES AND PRACTICES
TO DISINHERIT
As a general rule, the husband's property is free of any vested
interest of his wife and the wife's property is free of any vested in-
terest of the husband.35 One of the incidents of ownership of prop-
erty is the right to convey it without consent of another party, in-
cluding the right to deplete one's estate at death. The augmented
estate brings back into the decedent's estate certain transfers made
during the marriage for purposes of determining the surviving
spouse's elective share.
To apply the transfer provisions of section 2314(1) of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes,36 a transfer of property must be found.
The statute fails to specify in many situations what constitutes such
a transfer.37 If a transfer is found, the transferred property is not
32. "Scheming wives, if such there be, have attracted so little attention to
date. It would appear, however, that they have at least equal oppor-
tunity to avail themselves of these devices." Polster, supra note 15,
at 674 n.5.
33. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2314 comment (Reissue 1975); O'Connell & Effland,
Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law
of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARiz. L. REV. 205, 228-30
(1972).
34. The augmented estate will reduce substantially the number of elec-
tions because (1) the Uniform Probate Code will encourage and pro-
vide a legal basis for counseling testators against schemes to disinherit
the surviving spouse and (2) the surviving spouse will not be able to
elect if the decedent has already made adequate provision for her.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 comment (Reissue 197,5).
35. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-201 to 207 (Reissue 1974); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 4.66 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2314(1) (Reissue 1975).
37. Additions have been recommended by the Joint Editorial Board of a
reference to a bona fide purchaser in paragraph one, to a donee in
paragraph (1) (iv) and the addition of a definition of a bona fide pur-
chaser. The additions are intended to cure the problem that since any
transfer might be found to be for less than adequate and full consid-
eration in money or money's worth, all deeds from married persons
had to be joined in by both spouses, because if the grantor dies within
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included in the augmented estate to the extent that the decedent
received full and adequate consideration. A transfer for partial
consideration will only be included to the extent that the property
transferred exceeds the value of consideration received by the
transferor. In general, adequate and full consideration is a consid-
eration which is the economic equivalent of the transferred inter-
est.38 The consideration must be in money or money's worth; that
is, either money or something capable of being valued in terms of
money.39 Property transferred by the spouse is valued at the date
of decedent's death or the date the transfer became irrevocable,
whichever occurred first.
40
A. Antenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements
The rights of election of a surviving spouse and the surviving
spouse's rights to allowances and exemptions may be waived, in
whole or part, before or after marriage, by a written contract,
agreement, or waiver signed after fair disclosure.4 ' Antenuptial
agreements have previously been held to be valid in Nebraska.
42
The theory was that they were generally enforceable on the basis
of contractual principles.43 They have been found to be voidable
on grounds of fraud in the inducement,44 overreaching, undue influ-
ence, failure of full disclosure,4 5 or because they fell within the stat-
ute of frauds.
46
Postnuptial agreements are valid under the Nebraska Probate
Code which changed the prior Nebraska law.47 This is, in conform-
ity with the Married Women's Act 48 which permits the wife to con-
tract after marriage. Under the Married Women's Act, a majority
of the states gave effect to postnuptial agreements where the right
two years, the grantee may be subjected to the claim that the value
involved was part of the augmented estate. 8 UmFomv LAws ANNo-
TATED (Uniform Probate Code) § 2-202 comment (Supp. 1976).
38. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES § 14.4 (3d ed. 1974).
39. Id. § 14.3, at 355.
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(2) (ii) (Reissue 1975).
41. Id. § 30-2316.
42. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-106 (1943) (repealed 1974); Tavlin v. Tavlin, 194
Neb. 98, 230 N.W.2d 108 (1975).
43. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 31.
44. Estate of Grassman v. Jensen, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968).
45. W. MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 356.
46. 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 462 (1950).
47. See Smith v. Johnson, 144 Neb. 769, 14 N.W.2d 424 (1944); Chambers
v. Chambers, 155 Neb. 160, 51 N.W.2d 310 (1952). See also L.B. 1037,
1969 Neb. Laws 890 (amended prior law to allow for postnuptial
agreements in certain specified situations).
48. NEB. Rnv. STAT. §§ 42-201 to 207 (Reissue 1974).
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to the marital portion was surrendered, provided the contract is fair
and not made under duress. 49 This takes care of the situation in
which a spouse dies while a divorce suit is pending.50
A waiver of the surviving spouse's rights to the allowances and
exemptions would do nothing to reduce the size of the elective share
since allowances and exemptions are not included in the augmented
estate in the first place;5 1 however, the surviving spouse could lose
these rights. The statute of frauds problem is taken care of by
the requirement of a written contract. However, problems of proof
may arise regarding fair disclosure, especially after years have
passed and memories have faded. Further, the property may have
appreciated substantially in value since the time of the waiver.
B. Gifts
Completed inter vivos gifts by the decedent deplete the probate
estate. The Nebraska Probate Code includes in the augmented es-
tate all transfers made within two years of death of the decedent
in excess of three thousand dollars to any one donee in either of
the years.52 This means that within two years of death, six thou-
sand dollars may be given away to each donee and still not be in-
cluded in the augmented estate. The potential for disinheritance
by inter vivos transfers appears to be limited only by the number
of potential donees. Gifts made with the intent to defraud the sur-
viving spouse, under circumstances amounting to fraud, actual or
constructive are invalid,53 but fraudulent intent is not presumed.
The burden of proof is on the surviving spouse to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the gifts were made with a bad
motive and fraudulent intent.54 The general rule regarding inter
vivos gifts is that an absolute inter vivos gift is not a fraud on
the surviving spouse to the elective share unless the device is
merely colorable-enabling the donor to use and enjoy the property
during his lifetime, yet deprive the spouse of rights in it at his death
-or if the gift is made with a fraudulent intent.55 The Nebraska
Probate Code should not be interpreted as changing the common
law of Nebraska regarding inclusion of fraudulent conveyances in
the probate estate. Even gifts under three thousand dollars in ei-
49. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 31.
50. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2316 comment (Reissue 1975).
51. Id. § 30-2314.
52. Id. § 30-2314(1) (iv).
53. In re Estate of Sides, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930).
54. Id. at 323, 228 N.W. at 622.
55. See cases collected in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1965).
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ther of the two years prior to death should be included in the aug-
mented estate if made with fraudulent intent. However, because of
the normal exclusion now allowed for gifts under three thousand
dollars, proof problems will be encountered, and the de minimis
rule may apply.
The inclusion of gifts by a proximity of time factor has been
criticized as playing a relatively minor role in case law. The gen-
eral criticism has been that two years is irrelevant. A donee
is prejudiced merely because the gift occurred within two years
of the donor's death. Such would be the case in a transfer other
than in contemplation of death. The spouse is prejudiced with re-
spect to transfers occurring prior to the two year period. Time
should be of relatively minor importance in determining liability
for an elective share.5 6 However, it can also be argued that the
time proximity factor is not entirely irrelevant because large trans-
fers have more serious consequences to the surviving spouse if made
close to death rather than at an earlier time. The greater the lapse
of time, the more a donee should be justified in relying on his secur-
ity of title without liability to account. The Model Probate Code
recognized the reliance factor by adopting a three year cut off pe-
riod.57 The Nebraska Probate Code adopts a two year rule.
A possibility for disinheritance by gift exists in the transfer of
a residence to a third party with continued occupancy by the donor
until death. Where the donor had exclusive occupancy, the Internal
Revenue Service has been successful in finding that an understand-
ing existed in reserving a life estate in the donor, resulting in the
inclusion of the life estate in the donor's gross estate. But where
the donor lived in the residence with the transferees, the Internal
Revenue Service has been unable to include the residence in his
gross estate. Exclusive occupancy has been a significant factor.58
The language of the augmented estate is borrowed from the federal
estate tax law. To the extent that the language of the augmented
estate should be given an interpretation similar to that of the fed-
eral estate tax law,59 it follows that a spouse could transfer his
residence to his children and continue to reside in it if the trans-
ferees resided there also. If there is an understanding that the oc-
cupancy would be turned over to the grantor, the property will
be included in his gross estate for estate tax purposes, irrespective
56. W. MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 150.
57. Id. at 153-54.
58. C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, at 203-04.
59. AssociATIoN Or CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, supra
note 29, § 4.4.
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of whether or not the understanding is enforceable. 60 The same
reasoning should apply to the agumented estate.
C. Gifts Causa Mortis
Gifts causa mortis61 are testamentary under prior Nebraska
law62 and subject to the surviving spouse's right of election. Fur-
thermore, gifts causa mortis are made with the intent that title
should vest only in case of death and are revocable while the donor
lives.63 It is doubtful that the Nebraska Probate Code changes the
rule that gifts causa mortis are testamentary. If testamentary, gifts
causa mortis are therefore included in the probate estate. Even
if gifts causa mortis under three thousand dollars per year would
not be included within the language of section 30-2314(1) (iv),64
they would be included in the augmented estate as a transfer where
the decedent retained possession at the time of his death, or would
be included as a transfer which the decedent retained the right to
revoke for his own benefit.6 5
D. Joint Tenancy Property
The Nebraska Probate Code includes in the augmented estate
property transferred by the decedent during the marriage to an-
other and held at the time of death with right of survivorship.66
Property owned in joint tenancy 6 7 passes to the joint tenant by
virtue of the tenancy and not under the laws of descent and dis-
tribution. 8 The jointly owned property does not become a part
of the assets of the estate and the decedent's personal representa-
tive has no interest in the proceeds. 69 Under the Nebraska Probate
Code, property owned jointly with another will be included in the
computation of the surviving spouse's elective share, if transferred
for less than full and adequate consideration.
To exclude transferred joint tenancy property from the aug-
60. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (a), T.D. 6501.
61. See Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944);
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 485 (1929).
62. Yardum v. Evans, 120 Neb. 699, 235 N.W. 85 (1931).
63. Id. at 713, 235 N.W. at 91.
64. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (iv) (Reissue 1975).
65. Id. § 30-2314(i) and (ii).
66. NnB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (iii) (Reissue 1975).
67. See Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
68. Shelton v. Watkins, 188 Neb. 599, 198 N.W.2d 455 (1972).
69. McPherson v. Minier, 179 Neb. 212, 137 N.W.2d 719 (1965).
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mented estate, the joint tenancy must be severed. An existing es-
tate in joint tenancy can be destroyed by an act of one joint tenant
which is inconsistent with the joint tenancy. Such an act has the
effect of destroying the right of survivorship because one or more
of the necessary coexistent unities of possession, interest, time, and
title are destroyed70 After the destruction of a joint tenancy no-
thing more than a tenancy in common remains7 1 The spouse who
is seeking to disinherit will have created a cotenancy in common.
The augmented estate's inclusion of transferred property held with
right of survivorship should have no application to the undivided
interest held by the other cotenants in common.7 2 Property held
by a tenant in common passes to the tenant's heirs73 and will be
part of his estate. If the surviving spouse is the sole joint tenant,
very little will be achieved by simply severing the joint'tenancy-
the surviving spouse would own an undivided half interest which
must be included in the augmented estate as property owned by
the surviving spouse derived from the decedent, and the remaining
half interest would be in the decedent's estate and therefore subject
to the right of election. But after severance, the disinheriting
spouse can successfully disinherit by conveying his undivided half
interest if he can successfully avoid the other transfer provisions
which cause inclusion in the augmented estate, e.g., by a gift. If,
however, the joint tenant was one other than the surviving spouse,
severance of the transferred property held in joint tenancy will im-
mediately put a fractional share forever out of reach; only the de-
ceased spouse's undivided interest will be included in his estate and
subject to the right of election.
Nebraska recognizes a form of ownership where the right of sur-
vivorship is attached to a tenancy in common.7 4 A survivorship
attached to a tenancy in common is indestructible except by either
the voluntary action of all the tenants75 or a partition action.
6 The
right of survivorship of this form of ownership will cause its inclu-
sion in the augmented estate.
It seems that the principles for avoiding other transfers as fraud-
70. White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).
71. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
72. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (b) (1958). The section (I.R.C. § 2040) has
no application to property held by the decedent and any other person
(or persons) as tenants in common.
The augmented estate language is borrowed from the federal estate
tax law and should be given comparable interpretation. See AssocIA-
TION OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUcATION ADmINIsTRATORS, supra note 29.
73. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 35, § 6.5.
74. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
75. Id.
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2170 (Reissue 1975).
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ulent or illusory transfers should be applied to the destruction of
survivorship interests. The Nebraska Probate Code includes the
entire property held in joint tenancy in the augmented estate. To
avoid the severance on a fraud basis, actual fraud must be shown,
with the burden of proof on the surviving spouse.77 But because
of adverse federal estate tax consequences resulting from the use
of joint tenancies in estate planning, joint tenancies are not favor-
able devices. There is a ready-made estate planning argument to
counter a surviving spouse's claim of actual fraud. But if the trans-
fer was illusory,78 estate planning or business purpose notwith-
standing, it appears that the transfer should be set aside.
E. Multiple Party Accounts
There are three varieties of multiple party accounts: (1) joint
bank accounts in which deposits are in the name of the depositor
and/or in the name of the intended beneficiary, with or without
explicit mention of right of survivorship, (2) accounts in the name
of one person as an apparent trustee for a disclosed beneficiary-
the so called "Totten" trusts, 79 and (3) pay on death accounts where
a deposit is payable to one person on demand during his lifetime,
with the balance remaining at death to be paid according to the
express terms of the account.
Prior Nebraska law recognized the validity of a deposit in a bank
account in the name of two or more persons with delivery to either
of the survivors as a joint account of the payees with right of sur-
vivorship.80 The rule remains unchanged under the Nebraska Pro-
bate Code.8 ' Joint bank accounts pass to the survivor by virtue
of the contractual arrangement and are not to be considered testa-
mentary.8 2 At the death of a party of a joint bank account, the
balance of the account is not included in his probate estate. How-
ever, the account will be included in the augmented estate as prop-
erty held with another with right of survivorshipY'3 For federal
estate tax purposes, joint bank accounts are treated just like joint
77. In re Estate of Sides, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930).
78. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). See Rose v.
Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961). Contra, Rose v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 4.3 Ill. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
79. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
80. See Slocum v. Bohulov, 164 Neb. 156, 82 N.W.2d 39 (1957); NEB. Rsv.
STAT. § 8-136 (Reissue 1970) (repealed 1974).
81. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2704 ( ) (Reissue 1975).
82. Id. § 30-2706; W. MACDONALD, supra note 13, ch. 14 § 2.
83. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (iii) (Reissue 1975).
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tenancies.8 4 Furthermore, a joint bank account may be included
in the augmented estate as property in which the decedent retained
at the time of his death the right to revoke, consume, invade, or
dispose thereof for his own benefit.8 5 This is because the depositor
can ordinarily revoke a joint bank account by simply withdrawing
funds. Any sums in a joint bank account may be paid, on request,
to any party.8 6 Even though the bank account passes to the surviv-
ors of the joint account, the surviving spouse may claim an elective
share of the deposits to satisfy the elective share, if the deposit
falls within the augmented estate, even though the estate is sol-
vent.8 7 Thus, to defeat a spouse's right of election in a bank ac-
count, the funds must be withdrawn and placed in some other
medium or the form of the account must be altered by a written
notice given by a party to the financial institution under section
30-2705 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. 8
A person may make a savings deposit in his own name "as
trustee" for another person. The mere fact of a deposit in the name
of a depositor as trustee for another is sufficient to show an inten-
tion to create a revocable trust.89 Such a trust is called a tentative
trust or a "Totten" trust.90 The depositor of a Totten trust may with-
draw the whole or any part of the deposit at any time.91 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court has not previously ruled upon the validity
of a Totten trust;92 however, the Nebraska Probate Code establishes
the validity of a Totten trust in Nebraska 93 as a nontestamentary
device. 94 The rights of a surviving spouse in a Totten trust prior
to the Nebraska Probate Code are unclear. There is a difference
of opinion as to whether a spouse could create a Totten trust to
avoid the claim of a surviving spouse to an elective share. The
84. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, supra note 38, § 11.8, at 280;
Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b) (1958). But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2703
comment (Reissue 1975). The account operates as a valid disposition
at death rather than as a present joint tenancy.
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (ii) (Reissue 1975).
86. Id. § 30-2709.
87. Id. § 30-2707 comment.
88. Id. § 30-2705.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment(a) (1959).
90. The leading case establishing its validity is In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
71 N.E. 748 (1904).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
92. See Fasan, The One-Party Trust For Nebraskans, 6 CREiGHTON L. REV.
156, 171 (1972), for a discussion of an unreported decision in the Dis-
trict Court of Dodge County, Nebraska, upholding the validity of a
Totten trust account.
93. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2704(c) (Reissue 1975).
94. Id. § 30-2706.
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Second Restatement of Trusts takes the position that the surviving
spouse can include the deposit in computing the elective shareY5
But In re Halpern's Estate9 6 established the validity of a Totten
trust as a weapon of disinheritance.
Under the Nebraska Probate Code the augmented estate includes
transfers of property held with right of survivorship and revocable
transfers. The Totten trust under the Nebraska Probate Code is
a survivorship arrangement where the depositor also reserves
power to withdraw in whole or part at any time.9 7 The surviving
spouse can include the Totten trust account in the augmented estate
under these provisions.
The third form of multiple party accounts is the pay on death
account. The ordinary pay on death account takes the form of "A,
payable at death to B." A pay on death account takes effect only
after the death of the maker, vesting no present interest, only ap-
pointing what is to be done after death of the maker.9 8 Pay on
death accounts were previously held to be testamentary. 99 The Ne-
braska Probate Code recognizes the right of survivorship in pay
on death accounts' 0 0 and establishes their validity as a nontesta-
mentary device. 10 1 As in the case of other multiple party accounts,
the pay on death account is a survivorship scheme and will be in-
cluded in the augmented estate. Because a pay on death account
may be paid, on request, to any original party to the account, this
satisfies the requirement of a power to revoke, consume, invade,
or dispose of the property for the donor's benefit which would also
cause inclusion in the augmented estate.
To claim an elective share of a multiple party account, the sur-
viving spouse must proceed under section 30-2319 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes,'' to claim the elective share. The portion
charged against the account will be "equitably apportioned" among
the beneficiaries of the multiple party accounts according to their
interest therein.' 0 3 The surviving spouse may claim the elective
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment (e) (1959).
96. 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596, modified, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.
2d 894 (1950), alf'd, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
97. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2703, 2704 (Reissue 1975).
98. Young v. McCoy, 152 Neb. 138, 40 N.W.2d 540 (1950).
99. Id. at 141, 40 N.W.2d at 542.
100. NsB. REV. STAT. § 30-2704(b) (Reissue 1975).
101. Id. § 30-2706.
102. Id. § 30-2319.
103. Id. § 30-2319(b).
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share in the accounts even though the estate is otherwise solvent.
When so electing the spouse is not proceeding as a creditor.
0 4
F. Revocable Trusts
The revocable trust is an extremely useful estate planning tool.
In the typical revocable trust, the grantor retains the income for
life with an absolute unrestricted power to withdraw the principal
and terminate the trust at any time. If the grantor does not exer-
cise the power, the trust property will pass to the beneficiaries who
are designated to share in the trust fund at the grantor's death.
The grantor of a revocable trust is in much the same position as
a testator, i.e., he may change or revoke the instrument at any time,
and add or remove beneficiaries. Technically, the remaindermen
of a revocable trust legally own the property subject only to divest-
ment by exercise of the power, while a legatee under a will has
a mere expectancy. 0 5
The reservation by the settlor of a life estate, a power to re-
voke the trust in whole or in part, a power to modify the trust,
and a power to control the trustee in the administration of the trust
does not make the trust testamentary and invalid for failure to com-
ply with the Statute of Wills. 0 6 Revocable trusts have been used
to .successfully defeat the statutory share of a surviving spouse.
0 7
Under the prior elective share statutes where a surviving spouse
was entitled to a portion of the estate of which the surviving spouse
would not be deprived by will, a spouse could nevertheless transfer
property inter vivos in trust to the decedent for life, and the surviv-
ing spouse would not be entitled to a share of the property so trans-
ferred. 0 8 The argument against this result is that even though
a revocable trust is not so much testamentary as to be invalid under
the Statute of Wills, it is enough testamentary that it is against the
policy of the elective share statutes.10 9 However, in some instances
revocable trusts have been unsuccessful in defeating the spouse's
elective share where the trust was not merely revocable, but illu-
104. Id. § 30-2707 comment.
105. W. BOWE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION § 6.1 (1957).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959); 1 A. SCOTT, TRusTs
§ 57.1 (3d ed. 1967); National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315
Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Whalin v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650, 4
N.W.2d 737 (1942).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 comment (c) (1959); 1 A.
SCOTT, supra note 106, § 57.5.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 comment (c) (1959).
109. 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 106, § 57.5, at 511.
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sory,110 and where the disposition in trust would have been a fraud
on the surviving spouse.11 1
The Nebraska Probate Code reaches gratuitous transfers during
the decedent's lifetime where the decedent retained at his death
a power, either alone or with another person, to revoke, consume,
invade, or dispose of the transferred property for his own benefit.'
1 2
The language of the augmented estate here differs from the com-
parable estate tax provisions where lesser powers may cause inclu-
sion of the property in decedent's estate for estate tax purposes.
The typical revocable trust set up by the decedent during his life-
time will be included in the augmented estate.113 Therefore, the
method of defeating the share of the surviving spouse by revocable
trusts is closed by the Nebraska Probate Code. This result appears
to be sound.
Powers exercisable by one other than the decedent will not cause
inclusion of the trust property in the augmented estate. A transfer
revocable by one other than the decedent, without the decedent's
concurrence, is not taxable under the comparable estate tax provi-
sions. The same result has been reached even where the power
to revoke the transfer is vested in one who lacks a substantial ad-
verse interest, such as a trustee." 4 A power vested in a trustee,
other than the settlor, to alter or revoke is not a taxable power,
but the power must be one which gives the trustee a genuine dis-
cretion. If the settlor can remove the trustee and appoint himself
as trustee, the transferred property is taxable to his gross estate
on the theory that the settlor retained the power." 5 It follows
that an independent trustee possessing the power to alter or revoke
the trust will not cause inclusion of the trust in the decedent's aug-
mented estate.
G. Irrevocable Trusts
When the settlor of the trust did not expressly or impliedly re-
110. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). See Rose v. Rose,
300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172
Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961). Contra, Rose v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 43 Ill. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
111. 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 106, § 57.5 at 512, § 63 at 627; see, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 comment (c) (1959); Annot. 39 A.L.R.
3d 14 (1971).
112. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (ii) (Reissue 1975).
113. ASSOCIATION OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, supra
note 59.
114. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, § 8.4, at 147.
115. Id. at 148.
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serve a power to revoke the trust, the trust is irrevocable. 116 Irre-
vocable trusts are not included in the decedent's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes, unless they are made in contemplation
of death. If the trust is irrevocable, the surviving spouse is not
entitled to a distributive share of the property transferred by the
decedent in trust.1 7 The Nebraska Probate Code does not change
this result if the transfer is made more than two years prior to
death.
An irrevocable trust may be terminated if the settlor of the trust
and all the beneficiaries of the trust consent to the termination."l8
In the estate tax area, the termination of an irrevocable trust by
the settlor and all the beneficiaries does not make the trust a revo-
cable trust subject to estate tax. 19 The same result should follow
under the Nebraska Probate Code; that is, an irrevocable trust is
not within the reach of the augmented estate.
The augmented estate includes transfers in trust with the power
retained in the settlor to revoke, consume, invade, or dispose of the
principal for his own benefit. 20 If the decedent set up a trust dur-
ing his lifetime and neither retained the income nor a power to
revoke the trust, he could retain the powers to amend and powers
to control both income and principal, provided that such powers
did not allow him to benefit himself. 12' The Nebraska augmented
estate statute does not contain the "alter or amend" language of
section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code; 22 however, if the gran-
tor of the trust retained or reserved the right to apply the income
toward the discharge of a legal obligation, the property would be
included in his gross estate.123 The same result should follow for
inclusion in the augmented estate.
As noted, the retained power to revoke a trust will cause inclu-
sion in the augmented estate, and a power to revoke exercisable
by one other than the settlor will not cause its inclusion. Under
section 30-2314(1) (i) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, 124 retention
by the transferor of possession, enjoyment, or right to income from
the property will cause inclusion of the property in the augmented
116. 4 A. ScoTw, supra note 106, § 330.1.
117. 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 106, § 57.5, at 509.
118. 4 A. ScoTw, supra note 106, § 337, at 2688.
119. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, § 8.3.
120. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (ii) (Reissue 1975).
121. ASSOCIATioN OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATIoN ADMNSTRATORS, supra
note 59.
122. I.R.C. § 2038.
123. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (2), T.D. 6501.
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (i) (Reissue 1975).
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estate. A different situation exists when the grantor transfers the
property to an independent trustee who has power to distribute
income during the grantor's lifetime. Under the federal estate tax
law, if there were an implied or express agreement that the income
from the trust property would be turned over to the grantor, the
property would be included in his gross estate, irrespective of
whether the agreement was enforceable. 125 Similarly, an express
or implied agreement with an independent trustee should result in
inclusion of the property in the augmented estate under the Ne-
braska Probate Code on the theory that the decedent did not give
up the right to income from the property.
It is a different case when the independent trustee has uncon-
trolled discretion. If the trustee has uncontrolled discretion over
paying the income from the trust to the settlor, the power does
not constitute a retention of the right to income by the settlor. 12 6
In the absence of an understanding between the parties that the
income would be so distributed, it is reasonably certain that distri-
bution of all the income from the property to the settlor during
his life will not cause inclusion of the property in his gross estate
for estate tax purposes. 1 27 If the probate code is given an interpre-
tation comparable to the federal estate tax law, the same result
will follow in determining whether the trust property is included
in the augmented estate.
The comment to section 30-2314 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes
states that the "finespun" tests of the federal estate tax might be
utilized, but that the objectives of the tax laws are different and
more limited than the objective of the augmented estate of reaching
"those kinds of transfers readily usable to defeat an elective share
in only the probate estate. ' 128 Prior to the Uniform Probate Code,
irrevocable transfers were infrequently used to defeat the elective
share of the surviving spouse when other will substitutes were
available. But because the language of the augmented estate is bor-
rowed from the federal estate tax law, it would appear that it
should be given the same interpretation.129
H. Life Insurance
Life insurance is probably the most common and most effective
125. McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 829 (1959); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (a), T.D. 6501.
126. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, § 9.12, at 206;
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (3), T.D. 6501.
127. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, § 9.12, at 206.
128. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 comment (Reissue 1975).
129. ASSOCIATION OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, supra
note 59.
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will substitute. 130 The proceeds of the policy pass directly to the
beneficiary according to the terms of the insurance contract. A
policy of life insurance is not testamentary and does not need to
be executed with the formalities necessary for execution of a will.
Therefore, by investing in life insurance, one can reduce his estate
which is subject to probate administration. Within the limits of
a feasible amount of investment, life insurance is probably the most
satisfactory way to limit one's estate.13 1 Life insurance is an effec-
tive, although limited, tool for disinheritance because it reduces the
size of the probate estate from which a share is elected.
Under the Nebraska Probate Code, life insurance remains a valid
non-testamentary arrangement. Life insurance, accident insurance,
joint annuities, and pensions payable to one other than the surviv-
ing spouse are exempted from inclusion as transfers where the de-
cedent has retained a life income, power to revoke, right of survi-
vorship, or made a transfer in contemplation of death.1 32 Life in-
surance is not included in the first category of transfers to other
persons, which are included in the augmented estate because life
insurance is not ordinarily purchased as a way of depleting the pro-
bate estate to avoid the elective share.
33
But the rule has been changed regarding insurance payable to
the surviving spouse. Life insurance and accident insurance pro-
ceeds attributable to premiums paid by the decedent are included
in the augmented estate as property derived from the decedent.
3 4
The surviving spouse must first take credit for the insurance pro-
ceeds received when taking the elective share. 35  The purpose of
including life insurance in the augmented estate is to prevent over-
compensation to the electing spouse by forcing a deduction for in-
surance received. The policy reason is that a surviving spouse who
has received ample provision ought not be able to upset the dece-
dent's estate plan. 36 If -assets outside of probate administration
are not taken into account, the surviving spouse can collect all the
life insurance, all the joint property, etc., and then come in and
defeat the testator's estate plan by taking a share of the estate con-
trolled by the will.13 7 This should reduce the incentive to take an
elective share.
130. 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 16.3, at 755 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
131. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 39, at 161-62.
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (Reissue 1975).
133. Id. comment.
134. Id. § 30-2314(2) (i).
135. Id. § 30-2319(a).
136. Id. § 30-2314 comment.
137. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code--Questions and Answers, in 3
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Potential for disinheritance still remains. If the testator retains
the power to change the beneficiary, a non-testamentary disinherit-
ing transfer can be made by simply making the insurance payable
to a named beneficiary other than the estate or spouse.138  A testa-
tor can invest in single premium insurance policies payable to a
beneficiary other than his spouse and successfully defeat the
spouse's elective share. It would appear that this type of a transfer
would be open to attack on a fraud theory.1 39 However, courts
seem to take it for granted that life insurance is immune to the
surviving spouse's attack.140 As a practical matter, investing in life
insurance is not the best method of disinheritance because it in-
volves an immediate loss of income, but one may purchase a combi-
nation annuity-insurance package. Insurance companies are willing
to insure the elderly, regardless of health, when an annuity is pur-
chased as part of a package. Both the insurance proceeds and annu-
ity payments to a joint annuitant other than the surviving spouse
are excluded from the augmented estate. Under the comparable
federal estate tax provisions, the proceeds cannot be taxed as a re-
tained life estate.' 4 1 Similarly, the insurance proceeds would not
be includable in the decedent's augmented estate.
I. Life Insurance Trusts
A life insurance trust is created when a person takes out a policy
of insurance upon his life and creates a trust of the policy and its
proceeds. The trust may arise: (1) when the policy is payable to
a person designated in the policy as trustee, (2) when the policy
is payable to the beneficiary absolutely with an agreement between
the insured and beneficiary to hold it in trust, 42 or (3) when there
is an assignment to a person as trustee. 43 Life insurance trusts
may be funded or unfunded, revocable or irrevocable. The un-
funded life insurance trust contains no assets other than the insur-
ance policy itself or the trustee's expectancy as beneficiary of the
policy. A funded insurance trust includes money or other property
from which premiums nay be paid, in addition to the policy and
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 388, 393 (1968). Richard
Wellman was Chief Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code.
138. Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 506,
552 (1957).
139. W. MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 235-42.
140. Id. at 238.
141. See Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
142. See In re Estate of Reynolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
143. 1 A. Scott, supra note 106, § 57.3.
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rights under the policy. 4 4 Ordinarily, the proceeds are payable to
the trustee whose right to the proceeds depends upon the contract
with the insurance company rather than on the terms of the trust
agreement. 145 As in the case of an ordinary life insurance trans-
action, the insurance is not deemed to be an asset of the insured's
estate.146 Not being included in the estate, the proceeds are not
subject to the surviving spouse's elective share.
Under Nebraska law, a revocable insurance trust is not testa-
mentary even though the insured reserves the power to change the
beneficiary and the power to revoke or modify the trust.147 Under
the Nebraska Probate Code a revocable life insurance trust falls
within the class of revocable transfers includable in the augmented
estate. 48 Including a revocable insurance trust in the augumented
estate as a revocable transfer conflicts with the explicit exclusion
of all life insurance payable to a person other than the surviving
spouse. This is a specific exclusion to assets otherwise included in
the augmented estate. Where there is a "conflict between specific
provisions relating to a particular subject and general provisions
for the class to which the subject belongs, the specific provision
will be taken as creating an exception to the general rule."' 49 The
comment to the Nebraska augmented estate statute' 50 states that
life insurance is not included because it is not ordinarily purchased
as a way to deplete the estate. If the reason for not including life
insurance is its nondepleting use, it should make no difference
whether the life insurance is in a revocable trust or not. Because
of the policy reasons for non-inclusion of life insurance and the
rules of statutory construction, revocable life insurance trusts should
not be included in the augmented estate.
If the trust is irrevocable, the same principles applicable to other
irrevocable trusts will be generally applicable. 15' If not transferred
in contemplation of death, the proceeds of an irrevocable life insur-
ance trust will not be included in the augmented estate under any
144. See J. COHAN & G. HEMMERLING, INTER Vivos TRUSTS § 4.1, at 226
(1975).
145. Rea, supra note 138, at 537.
146. See T. ATKIN SoN, supra note 7, at § 39 (1953); In re Estate of Rey-
nolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
147. In re Estate of Reynolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 comment (f) (1959); T. ATKISON,
supra note 7, § 39.
148. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (ii) (Reissue 1975).
149. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAws § 103, at 325 (2d ed. 1911).
150. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2314 comment (Reissue 1975).
151. See text accompanying notes 116-29 supra.
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of the four types of transfers under section 30-2314(1) of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes. 152 The reasons for excluding revocable
life insurance trusts apply equally to irrevocable trusts.
J. Partnership Survivor Agreements
Dissolution of a partnership occurs on the death of any part-
ner.153 Unless otherwise agreed upon, if a business is continued
after the death of a partner, the value of the deceased partner's
interest in the dissolved partnership, plus interest, or in lieu of in-
terest, profits from the use of his interest in the business, is included
in the deceased partner's estate. 5 4  The estate's interest in a busi-
ness which is not continued is the deceased partner's share of the
surplus after the partnership liabilities are discharged.
55
Generally, it is undesirable to liquidate the partnership. When
the surviving partners desire to continue the business after the
death of one partner, a continuation agreement may be embodied
in the partnership agreement.15 Continuation agreements are
valid on ordinary contract principles' 57 and are not regarded as
testamentary, or requiring execution in conformance with the pro-
cedure for a will.5 8 Normally to avoid being testamentary, the
continuation agreement requires consideration which can easily be
found in the various promises of the partners. 59
Upon the death of a partner, disposition of his interest may be
made in several ways. If the partnership is dissolved, the value
of the deceased partner's interest is included in his probate estate. 60
The partners may agree with one another to bequeath their interest
to the survivors, the consideration being the reciprocal promises.
A continuation agreement may provide that the surviving partners
purchase the decedent's interest. Insurance may be used to fund
the purchases, and options may be granted to the survivors to pur-
chase the interest at each partner's death. There may also be an
152. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (Reissue 1975).
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-331(4) (Reissue 1976).
154. Id. § 67-342.
155. Id. § 67-338.
156. Fuller, Partnership Agreements For The Continuation Of An Enter-
prise After The Death Of A Partner, 50 YALE L.J. 202 (1940).
157. See generally id.; see also Note, 20 OKLA. L. REV. 456 (1967).
158. See Note, supra note 157, at 457; T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 40 at
166; Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1176, § 36 (1948).
159. See Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 43 TEx. L. REV. 631, 656 (1965). For the various kinds of contin-
uation agreements upheld as non-testamentary, see id. at 655 n.141.
160. Thorin v. Kurkowski, 192 Neb. 701, 224 N.W.2d 173 (1974).
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installment purchase, with the installment amounts determined by
profits over a fixed period.161 The partners may agree that on the
death of a partner, the surviving partners become the sole owners,
legally and equitably, of the entire partnership property without
any payment or liability to the decedent's estate.'
62
Available means to disinherit a spouse by use of a partnership
continuation agreement include a partnership in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship in the beneficial interests of a partner, 6 3 or
a gratuitous or near gratuitous transfer to the surviving part-
ners.16 4  Joint tenancy partnerships may run afoul of the aug-
mented estate's inclusion of transfers of property held with right
of survivorship. Transfers are included in the augmented estate
only if made for less than full and adequate consideration, and it
would appear that each partner's contribution to the partnership
would be adequate consideration.
In other situations, a business purchase agreement may provide
that upon the death of a partner, his associates will carry on the
business and pay the deceased partner's estate a fixed share of the
profits for a stated period of time, rather than a sale and purchase
of his interest. It has been held that under a profit sharing ar-
rangement, the profits are income, not a capital asset, and therefore
not includable in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 6 5
Other cases have held the right to share in profits to be a valuable
asset which is included in his federal estate tax gross estate. 66 The
reasoning is that a right to future income is a valuable property
interest. If the person dies owning this right to the profits, this
is a valuable right, and it is difficult to see why the result should
be different depending on whether the right is regarded as a pur-
chase price or as a share of future profits. 67 As a valuable prop-
erty right, it should be included in the decedent's federal estate
tax gross estate, and in his probate estate as property owned at
161. Note, Partnership Survivor Agreements, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1303-
04 (1959).
162. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAw OF PARTNERSHIP § 90A, at 510 n.60
(1968).
163. Note, supra note 161, at 1304-06; W. MAcDONALD, supra note 13, at 232.
164. Gratuitous transfers are rarely advisable, and then only if it is within
the close family, or if the close family is otherwise adequately pro-
vided for or is non-existent. The absence of consideration makes the
continuation agreement more difficult to enforce. Bromberg, supra
note 159, at 656-57.
165. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
166. McClennen v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942); Estate of Hull v.
Comm'r, 38 T.C. 512 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 325 F.2d 367 (3d
Cir. 1963).
167. C. LOWNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 38, § 4.11, at 52.
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death. Property of the probate estate is included in the augmented
estate.
K. United States Savings Bonds
The ownership of United States bonds is solely a subject of fed-
eral regulation.168 The form of registration must express the ac-
tual ownership of the bond and will be considered as conclusive
of ownership and interests in the bond.169 Savings bonds are not
transferable except as specifically provided in the federal regula-
tions. 170 To be transferred, the bond must be surrendered and re-
registered. Savings bonds cannot be the subject of a gift, either
inter vivos or causa mortis, by manual delivery to a donee unless
the bonds are also surrendered and reissued in accordance with the
treasury regulations.17 '
The estate created in a bond is a matter of contract between
the purchaser of the bonds and the United States. The treasury
regulations govern, even if state law is to the contrary. 172 The reg-
ulations override or pre-empt inconsistent state law. A contrary
result would fail to give effect to a term or condition under which
a federal bond is issued.
73
The treasury regulations under which bonds are issued also cre-
ate a right of survivorship. 174 The Nebraska Probate Code brings
into the augmented estate any transfer, without adequate consid-
eration, of property which is held at the decedent's death by another
with a right of survivorship. Under the treasury regulations, bonds
in co-ownership pass to the co-owner at death. If the bond is in-
cluded in the augmented estate, liability for the elective share is
equitably apportioned among recipients of the property included
in the augmented estate. 175 This means that where the determina-
tion of ownership rights is pre-empted by federal law under the
supremacy clause, state law may charge the owners of the bonds
with liability for a surviving spouse's elective share. In New York,
the transfer of bonds to a designated beneficiary on the purchaser's
168. 31 U.S.C. § 757(c) (1970); United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257
(1973).
169. 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1976).
170. Id. § 315.15.
171. Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969); 31 C.F.R.
§ 315.45 (1976).
172. United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,
376 U.S. 306 (1964).
173. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
174. 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (1976).
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2319(b) (Reissue 1975).
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death has been held effective against the objection that the act con-
stitutes fraud on the widow's share.176 The reasons which have
been advanced for the federal pre-emption survivorship rule-the
requirement of government uniformity and for proper record keep-
ing demand something less than absolute freedom of transfer-
hardly seem to justify a result that a co-owner takes free and clear
of any liability for the surviving spouse's elective share. Any other
result would permit unlimited opportunity to disinherit by simply
investing in bonds.
Despite the fact that federal regulations are conclusive in regard
to the ownership and interest in the bond, Series E bonds have
been subjected to levy,177 a legal representative can pursue the pro-
ceeds of a fraudulent transfer for benefit of creditors,1 78 a judgment
creditor can subject the bond purchaser's interest to payment of
purchaser's debts, 1 79 the bankrupt must surrender bonds to the
trustee in bankruptcy,8 0 and a widow under an elective share stat-
ute is allowed to pursue what she lost when the bond passed to
the co-oWner.' 8 ' Government savings bonds held in co-ownership
should not be excluded from the augmented estate solely because
federal law fixes ownership in bonds. Based upon the express in-
tent of the Nebraska Probate Code that all. forms of transferred
property held with right of survivorship are included in the aug-
mented estate, savings bonds should not be excluded. The policy
reasons for pre-emption by federal regulations do not justify the
result that bonds are exempt from inclusion in the augmented es-
tate as transfers intended to defeat the rights of a surviving spouse.
L. Deeds
"It is no objection to a deed that it is used as a substitution
for a will .... 182 The distinction between a deed and a will is
that a deed passes a present interest in property to the grantee
in the grantor's lifetime and is not revocable, while a will passes
no interest prior to the death of the testator and is freely revocable
prior to death.'8 3 If the instrument purporting to be a deed is held
176. In re Will of Kalina, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1945).
177. Guldager v. United States, 204 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1953).
178. In re Estate of Laundiree, 195 Mlisc. 754, 91 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1949), rev'd
on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1950).
179. Ex parte Little, 259 Ala. 532, 67 So. 2d 818 (1953).
180. In re Bartlett, 71 F. Supp. 514 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
181. Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434,43 A.2d 157 (1945).
182. Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary?, 18 M1cu. L. REV. 470, 470
(1920).
183. T. ATISON, supra note 7, § 43; 1 W. PAGE, supra note 130, § 6.9.
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to be testamentary, the property will be included in the decedent's
estate regardless of any invalidity such as fraud or colorable trans-
fers. Purported transfers of property at death, reservation of a
right of revocation, failure to deliver, or delivery to a third person
for delivery to the grantee upon the happening of an uncertain
event, will make the conveyance testamentary.
84
The most interesting question arises when the instrument is not
testamentary: Is the surviving spouse's right of election extin-
guished in the deeded realty? Under the prior dower statutes, ali-
enation of property by the husband without the wife's consent did
not extinguish her dower rights.18 5 Under the former elective
share statutes, one spouse could give away real estate within the
state during his life without his spouse's consent. Uncompensated
transfers of real property have been sustained on a number of
grounds as not a fraud on the spouse's rights-e.g., irrevocable, non-
illusory transfers, protection of children of prior marriage-but
have also been attacked successfully, at least to the extent of the
spouse's rights.'8 6 As in the case of inter vivos gifts, transfers of
real estate by deed could be attacked on grounds of whether the
transfer was absolute, merely a colorable transaction, or fraudulent.
However, a condition precedent upon delivery of a deed to a third
person that the grantee should survive the grantor does not affect
the validity of the deed as a conveyance. Nothing more is required
than
that the deed [create] an irrevocable possibility of executory inter-
est in the grantee, which renders the title of the grantor subject to
be drawn out of him at a future time, and gives the grantee a right
which will vest in the event designated according to the terms of
the deed.18 7
Generally a conveyance which reserves a life estate to the grantor
also passes a present interest to the grantee subject to such life
estate in the deed.'
8 8
In Nebraska, a conveyance in which title does not pass until the
maker's death, i s testamentary. 8 9 The property in such a case is
included in the decedent's probate estate and augmented estate.
This result is not changed by the Nebraska Probate Code because
184. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 43. See generally Ballantine, supra note
182.
185. Keegan, Deeds in Lieu of Wills, 16 A.B.A. J. 779, 781 (1930).
186. See cases collected in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 521, § 15 (1956).
187. Ballantine, supra note 182, at 480.
188. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 130, § 6.10, at 247.
189. Neylon v. Parker, 177 Neb. 187, 128 N.W.2d 690 (1964) (deeds not de-
livered to a third party).
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of the testamentary character. In conveyances to take effect upon
the grantor's death, the fact of delivery is an argument in finding
the instrument to be a deed.190 Undelivered deeds have no effect
as a conveyance. However if the deed is delivered, a conveyance
where title does not pass until the grantor's death, would fall within
the augmented estate's inclusion of transfers where the decedent
retained at the time of his death the possession or enjoyment of
the property.
Under prior Nebraska law, a warranty deed subject to the reser-
vation of a life estate in real property, executed and delivered, but
not recorded until after the death of the grantor, was legal, effec-
tive, and nontestamentary.' 9 ' In such a case a surviving spouse
would not have a right of election in the deeded property. Under
the Nebraska Probate Code a transfer reserving a life estate will
be included in the augmented estate. Thus, the use of a warranty
deed with a reserved life estate in the grantor will not avoid the
surviving spouse's right of election in the transferred property.
M. Annuity Contracts and Retirement Programs
A -specific exclusion from the augmented estate is made for the
transfer of joint annuities and pensions payable to a person other
than the surviving spouse. 9 2 Similar to insurance, the commuted
value of the annuity contract proceeds and amounts under pension
plans, both private and public, or retirement plans payable to the
surviving spouse, are included in the augmented estate as property
owned by the surviving spouse derived from the decedent. 9 3 The
surviving spouse must take credit for this property against the elec-
tive share.' 94 The reason for excluding joint annuities and pensions
payable to one other than the surviving spouse is the same as
for excluding insurance, i.e., it is not ordinarily purchased as a way
to deplete the probate estate. At least in the case of employer
funded pension and profit sharing plans, this policy reason seems
correct. For qualified plans under section 401 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code,19- the funding level must satisfy the funding re-
quirements in order to maintain its qualified status. Thus, the op-
portunity to empty the estate is not present.
190. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 43.
191. County Bd. of Supervisors v. Breese, 171 Neb. 37, 105 N.W.2d 478
(1960).
192. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314(1) (Reissue 1975).
193. Id. § 30-2314(2).
194. Id. § 30-2319(a).
195. I.R.C. § 401(a).
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Purchase of a commercial annuity would escape the surviving
spouse's right of election because the transfer is for full and ade-
quate consideration. Under a life only annuity option, any interest
the decedent has in the annuity ceases at his death.19 6 If a joint
and survivor option is elected, payments will continue to the joint
annuitant on an uninterrupted basis after the primary annuitant's
death. The drawback of a joint and survivor annuity is that the
co-annuitant cannot be changed once the annuity is purchased. The
specific exclusion from the augmented estate of joint annuities is
a wise policy decision. Since payments continue on an uninter-
rupted basis after the primary annuitant's death, to subject such
payments to the right of election would create complex tracing
problems and liability problems for both the joint annuitant and
the insurance company. The other alternative would be to tie up
the payments at least until the period for election has lapsed; there-
fore, no payments could safely be made during this period without
possible liability.
The drawback of a commercial annuity is that the annuitant
loses his investment in the annuity and cannot transfer the amount
paid for the annuity to his family. This can be overcome by trans-
ferring the property during their lives to members of the family
whom they wish to inherit their estate in return for the transferee's
promise to pay the transferor an annuity.197 A private annuity is
an arrangement whereby an individual transfers cash or other prop-
erty to another individual, corporation, or entity in exchange for
the transferee's promise to make periodic payments in fixed
amounts to the transferor for the remainder of his life, the trans-
feree being someone who is not in the business of selling annui-
ties.198  Private annuities are similar to, but not the same as, re-
tained life estates. If the annuity payments are approximately the
same as those which would be made by a commercial company for
similar premiums, the transferor retains no interest in the trans-
ferred property. 99
The essential difference between the commercial and private an-
nuity is that the purchaser of a private annuity does not actually
part with his property, but passes it along to the person to whom
196. Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Trans-
fers For Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights, Fam-
ily Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 50, 65 (1966).
197. Id.
198. Weinberg, The New Case For Private Annuities, 51 NEB. L. REv. 9, 10
(1971).
199. Lowndes, supra note 196, at 65.
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he wishes to give it at death. In substance, he makes a gift of the
property to the transferee who promises to pay the annuity.20 0 Pri-
vate annuity arrangements are scrutinized to determine whether
the transaction really represents the purchase of an annuity for
an adequate consideration. If the transferor receives nothing more
than income from the property transferred as the armuity, the
transaction is nothing more than the reservation of a life estate.
20
1
The test to determine whether the transferor has a life estate for
federal estate tax purposes, is whether he can legally control the
income of the property.20 2 If so, the property is included in his
federal estate tax gross estate. It should also be included in his
augmented estate as a transfer with a retained right to income.
What constitutes adequate consideration for estate tax purposes
is determined by the treasury regulations.20 3 If the transferor pays
more for the annuity than the value established under the tables,
there is a gift for federal gift tax purposes.20 4 Under the Nebraska
Probate Code, if the transferor lives more than two years after the
transfer, the property is not included in the augmented estate.
However, if made in contemplation of death, the whole value of
the property, less the present value of the annuity, is included in
the federal estate tax gross estate. This reaches only the gift ele-
ment and appreciation. This appears to be a correct calculation
of the gift. The Nebraska Probate Code should follow this result,
despite the comment that the finespun tests of the federal estate
tax might be used, but that the objectives are different. In this
case, the objectives are the same, i.e., to reach a gift made in contem-
plation of death.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditions of the common law and later statutory substitutes
provided for some protection of the surviving spouse's interest.
Protection is found by the statutory procedure whereby the surviv-
ing spouse has the power to elect a share of the decedent's estate
rather than relying upon the will. The questions have arisen as to
the proper size of the protected interest. The augmented estate
is the latest attempt at setting the statutory rights of a surviving
spouse. Even under the augmented estate, the following methods
may still allow a testator to defeat the statutory right:
200. Id. at 66.
201. See Estate of Moreno v. Comm'r, 260 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958); Toeller's
Estate v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948). But see Estate of
Becklenberg v. Comm'r, 278 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
202. Weinberg, supra note 198, at 30.
203. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (1970).
204. Weinberg, supra note 198, at 27-29.
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1. Absolute gifts will defeat the statutory rights if made more
than two years prior to death. For each of the two years
immediately prior to death, gifts under $3,000 will also defeat
the statutory right.
2. A gift of the testator's residence may defeat the statutory
right as long as the testator continues to reside in a non-
exclusive occupancy with the donee.
3. A testator should not use joint tenancies. All joint tenancies
held with persons other than the spouse should be severed.
The surviving spouse will have to account for property re-
ceived by right of survivorship when electing a share.
4. The use of irrevocable trusts with an independent trustee
having the absolute discretion to pay income to the grantor
may defeat the statutory right.
5. The investment by the testator in commercial life insurance-
annuity contract arrangements may defeat the statutory
right.
6. The purchase of a private annuity from an intended bene-
ficiary may defeat the statutory right.
7. The testator should change life insurance beneficiary desig-
nations to persons other than the testator or the testator's
estate. The testator should consider changing beneficiary
designations under group life insurance and retirement pro-
grams to the spouse because these amounts do not deplete the
estate while the surviving spouse must first account for such
amounts.
It is correct that the revocable living trust offered the most ben-
efits and freedom of control while still keeping the property out
of the spouse's reach. The augmented estate offers more protection
for the surviving spouse's right of election; however, the augmented
estate also takes away by forcing the surviving spouse to account
for property received from the decedent while at the same time
presuming that all property owned by the surviving spouse is de-
rived from the decedent. While more adequate than the intestate
share, the augmented estate still provides some loopholes, but the
biggest avoidance devices are now closed.
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